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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH

ALMA J. JANKE et ux,

Plaintiffs
and Respondents,
-vs.-

Case No. 8866

GEORGE L. BECKSTEAD, JR., et ux,

Defendants
and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Appellants will be referred to throughout this Brief
by name or as they appeared in the Court below, namely,
plaintiffs . Respondents will be referred to by name or as
they appeared below, namely defendants. All italics are
ours.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal is from the judgment in favor of plaintiffs which ordered the rewriting of a Deed from defendants to plaintiffs. Defendants' counterclaim for the
reasonable value of their land used by plaintiffs and for
damages resulting from the malicious clouding of defendants' title to certain lands was dismissed.
The basic contest between plaintiffs and defendants
involves a strip of land 33 feet wide. The reformation
of the deed ordered by the trial court moved the 33-foot
strip from the west side of plaintiffs' land to the east side
of plaintiffs' land and had the effect of cutting down land
retained by defendant, Fay D. Beckstead, from a piece
75 feet wide to a piece 42 feet wide.
Defendant, Fay D. Beckstead~ was, prior to January,
195 I, the owner of a piece of property located at 5 I 65
South 9th East Street, Salt Lake County. On said piece
of property defendants had built a home and in January,
195 I they offered said home for sale through the Bettilyon's Home Builders Co. Bettilyons interested plaintiffs in purchasing the home and on the 30th of January,
1951, a Uniform Real Estate Contract was executed by
all parties.
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An Earnest Money Receipt dated January 13, 1951
had been signed by all of the parties and is Exhibit No. 11.
The price as set forth in the Earnest Money Receipt shows
that the ground to be sold was 140-foot front by 200foot deep, together with a share of water. A closing statement shows the proration of taxes, insurance and reveals
an examination of the abstract of title to the property.
The Uniform Real Estate Contract showed the address of the property and contained the following metes
and bounds description:
Com in cen county road 16.2 chs S & N 86° 10'
W 13.55 chs fr cen Sec. 8, T 2S, R IE, SL Mer.
thence 140 feet South; thence 200 feet East, thence
140 feet North, thence 200 feet West to the point
of beginning;
Together with one share Tanner Ditch Water Company.
The Uniform Real Estate Contract also contains
a provision that a mortgage was to be assumed by plaintiffs and the purchase price of the land to be paid down
to the mortgage as soon as plaintiff sold certain of their
real property. The mortgage is Exhibit No. 13. It shows
the description of the West 158 feet of the property which
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was covered by the Uniform Real Estate Contract. The
mortgage contains a specific reference to the 33 foot right
of way for 9th East Street.
At the time the defendants signed the Uniform Real
Estate Contract, Exhibit No. 9, the defendant Fay D.
Beckstead was the owner of additional property at the
same place. It is described as commencing in the center
of 9th East Street, going South 250.86 feet, East 275 feet,
North 232.43 feet, more or less; thence west 275.616 feet
to the point of beginning.
No.4).

<See description in Exhibit

This description with the piece described to plaintiff eliminated, left a piece in the name of Mrs. Fay Beckstead of approximately 75.616 feet wide along the east side
of the property contracted to plaintiffs.
Prior to the signing of the Uniform Real Estate Contract, defendants did not discuss with plaintiffs the
boundary lines of the property. There \Yas nothing on
the plot which showed where the east side of the property
contracted to plaintiffs was located. After the Uniform
Real Estate Contract was executed there was a meeting
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between defendants and plaintiff, Alma J. Janke, which
occurred in the basement of the Y.M.C.A. At the meeting there was some discussion concerning the possibility
of selling the retained land which defendant, Fay Beckstead owned. A price could not be agreed upon and so
no deal was consumated. Plaintiff, Alma Janke, also
stated that there was a discussion concerning certain
water which had flooded the basement of the home
which was purchased from the Becksteads. ( R. 62,
R. 63 and R. 162).

Apparently the meeting between the Jankes and the
Becksteads, in the basement of the Y.M.C.A., was the
only discussion in 1951 of any of the problems which the
parties were concerned with. In December, 1951, a Deed
to the property involved was prepared. Photostat of this
deed is Exhibit No. I 0. Description in the deed followed
the description contained in the Uniform Real Estate
Contract, and further recites that the property is transferred subject to a mortgage in favor of Tracy-Collins
Trust Company in the original sum of $7200.00 upon
which there was an unpaid balance of $6673.11. Grantees
assumed and agreed to pay the mortgage according to
its terms. This is the mortgage which is Exhibit No. 13.
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Plaintiffs went into possession of the property in
March of 1951, and during all of the year of 1951 occupied the premises either through their daughter who
lived in the basement, or personally. <R. 61).
The mortgage which was assumed specifically men-:
tions the right-of-way on the west 33 feet of the property.
At the time the Deed was prepared and the assumption
of the mortgage was agreed to, an attorney's opinion was
obtained for A. J. Janke by Tracy-Collins Trust Company.
This attorney's opinion is dated January 3, 1952 and is
Exhibit No. 12. The opinion shows that the abstract was
brought up to date as of 8:55A.M. on December 31, 1951.
The opinion specifically mentions the 33-foot right-ofway along the West side of the property in two separate
places.
Plaintiffs deny that they ever read either the descriptions of the property as contained in the Uniform Real
Estate Contract or in the Deed ''"hich '\Yas furnished to
them or that they ever saw the mortgage which they assumed and agreed to pay, or knew of the attorney's
opinion.

They claim that the only place where they found
any indication as to where the property lines were was
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on a copy of certain plats which were used in the construction of the home by Beckstead. Exhibit No. 5.
Exhibit No. 5 is the copy of the Plans and Specifications of the house which were furnished for the
builder, George Barnett.
There is nothing in the Plans or Specifications to
indicate the property line of defendants' property at the
time the home was under construction.
Plaintiffs claim that the builders' copy of the Plans
and Specifications for the construction of the home were
furnished to them by E. R. Beckstead, one of the Real
Estate salesmen working for Bettilyon's Real Estate Company. Beckstead denies that he furnished the Plans and
Specifications. The Plans and Specifications show only
that the house being purchased by plaintiffs was located
40 feet back from the edge of the 9th East Street rightof-way.
After the deed to the property had been delivered,
and some time prior to October 31, 1953, defendants discovered that plaintiffs were constructing a dog-run and
other structures on the east side of their property which
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appeared to be over on the property defendant, Fay Beckstead, had retained. Mr. Beckstead and one, Hall, measured the ground and discovered that it was a fact that the
plaintiffs were on the property.
A letter was written, Exhibit No. 7, dated the 31st
day of October, 1953.
This letter clearly notifies plaintiffs that defendants
claim that plaintiffs are occupying a portion of the property which was retained by Fay Beckstead. It gives plaintiffs the right to purchase the property when defendants
decided to sell.
Numerous conversations occurred between Fay Beckstead and the Jankes concerning the occupancy by Jankes
of part of Mrs. Beckstead's property. An additional letter
was written on May 24, 1954, Exhibit P-8, concerning the
property being occupied by Jankes, and this letter set a
rental fee of $25.00 per year on the property. No rent
was paid. On March 18, 1955 a letter was written by
Hurd & Hurd. This letter, Exhibit No. 14, points out to
the plaintiffs their occupancy of property in excess of
that which was sold to them, refers to the $25.00 per year
rental item, and requests information concerning the action which the Jankes intended to take.
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Additional conversations occurred. No satisfactory
solution could be agreed upon, and on August 8, 1956
plaintiffs filed the complaint which commenced the action now on appeal to this court.

The evidence concerning discussions which occurred
after the deed was delivered is not reconcilable. Defendants deny that they have ever stated that the line
marking the west boundary of the property sold to plaintiffs was in any place other than in the middle of 9th
East Street. Plaintiffs testified that on several occasions,
when discussions occurred, Mr. Beckstead indicated that
the property line was somewhere along the edge of the
right of way for 9th East Street. There was no evidence
that Mrs. Beckstead had ever made any statement to
either of plaintiffs concerning the line along the west
side of the property.

The only monument referred to in the Deed, Uniform Real Estate Contract, or Mortgage, is the center of
9th East Street, There is no dispute between the parties
that said monument has remained in the same position
at all times relevant to the dispute.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING A DEED TO BE VARIED
BY PAROL EVIDENCE.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING A DEED TO BE VARIED
BY PAROL EVIDENCE.

The warranty deed was delivered on or about the
29th day of December, 1951, the date it bears. It contained a description of the real property which was being
transferred by Fay Beckstead to plaintiffs in the following language:
"Commencing at a point in the center of a
County road 16.2 chains South and North 86°
10' West 13.55 chains, more or less, from the center of Section 8, Township 2 South, Range 1 East,
Salt Lake Meridian; thence 140 feet South; thence
200 feet East; thence 140 feet North; thence 200
feet West to the point of beginning."
The description clearly sets forth a metes and bounds
description which can be traced and closed and which
does not, therefore, contain any patent ambiguity. It
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contains no ambiguity which is obvious from the reading
of the description. The description can also be traced out
on the ground as is revealed by the Plat. (Exhibit No.
16). As a consequence there are neither patent or latent
ambiguities in the description contained in the Warranty
Deed from Fay Beckstead to the plaintiffs.
There was no representation by defendants concerning the commencement line of the property prior to
the execution of the Uniform Real Estate Contract which
contained an identical description to the description
placed in the Warranty Deed. The evidence of the defendants indicates that they were never on the ground
with plaintiffs during the year 1951 but only at a conference with the plaintiff, Alma Janke, at the Y.M.C.A.
during that year. At that meeting the boundary line of
the property was not the subject matter of the discussion.
There was no evidence that there was a mistake of
fact on the part of the defendants concerning where the
Fay Beckstead property commenced. Apparently, they
were well aware at all times that the property ran from
the middle of 9th East Street.

If there were latent ambiguities within the deed so
that until ym.! applied the description to the ground one
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could not discover the ambiguity, evidence of a parol
nature would be admissible under the general rule. For
a discussion of the cases setting forth the Rule where a
latent ambiguity appears in the description of the real
property, see Detroit, Grand Haven & Milwaukee RR
Co. v. Alfred -Howland, 246 Mich. 318, 224 NW 366,
68 ALR 1.

If the ambiguity is a patent ambiguity and it appears from an examination of the description that there
is some kind of a mistake or discrepancy within the four
comers of the description, then the rule has always been
that no parol evidence shall be admitted to correct the
deed for the deed itself is void for uncertainty. A very
careful examination of latent and patent ambiguities is
contained in Thompson, On Real Property, Vol 6, page
454, Section 3280 and Section 3281.
There appears to be no exception to the rule that
where the description in the deed sufficiently identifies
the land to be conveyed neither parol or extrinsic evidence
concerning the land to be covered by the deed is admissible.
It makes no difference that one of the parties had a
different intention as far as the property to be received
is concerned if his intentions are uncommunicated and not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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contained in the description placed on the deed. It is
obvious that a unilateral mistake by one of the parties
would not justify reformation of the deed where the mistake was in no way induced by conduct of the other party
and did not involve fraud. This rule is set forth in Brent
v. Chase H. Lilly Co., 174 Fed. 877. The rationale of the
rule is succinctly stated in Cordua v. Guggenheim, 274
N.Y. 51, 8 NE 2d 274 where it is stated that the parties
are conclusively presumed to have intended the meaning
of the language used in the description of the property
conveyed. Thompson, On Real Property, supra, Section
3281, at page 455, states the rule in this language:
"Nothing passes by deed except what is described in it whatever the intention of the parties
might have been."
Many of the Evidence Treatise writers have recognized that while the parol evidence rule is called a rule
of evidence, as an actual fact, it is a rule of substantive
law which is adhered to for the purpose of preventing
written instruments from being eaten away and destroyed
by parties attempting to recall the agreement or description. It is obvious that if a written instrument could be
varied by recollection of the parties, the purpose for reducing the document to writing, and the purpose of having written deeds would be completly destroyed.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
Jones on Evidence, 4th Ed. Vol. 2, page 863, Section 450, states the rule from an evidence treatise point
of view in the following language:

"Parol evidence is not admissible to identify
the land where the description in the contract is
insufficient, nor may it be introduced in order
to make the writing operative upon land which
is not embraced in the descriptive words."
One of the earliest cases setting forth the rule in its
complete form is Drew v. Swift, 46 N. Y. 204, decided
September 2nd, 1871. At page 208, the following quote
appears:
"The declarations of the defendant, or other
parol evidence, could not be resorted to, to vary
the terms or aid in the interpretation of the instrument. The description begins at a point capable of being ascertained, and runs thence by
courses and distances well defined; and no extrinsic evidence tending to explain the intention
of the parties, and thus give effect to the deed
different from its terms, was allowable. A deed
cannot be contradicted, varied or explained by
parol evidence. (Linscott v. Fernald, 5 Greenl. 496;
Bell v. Morse 6N.H. 205; Van Wyck v. Wright,
supra ( 18 W.R. 157) Clark v. Baird, 5 Seld., 183;
Clark v. Wethy, 19 Wend. 320). It is distinctly
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declared in the cases cited, and others that might
be referred to, that upon principle, when the description in the deed designates a piece of land as
that conveyed, the description cannot be departed
from, by parol evidence of intent, or of acquiescence in another boundary, unless such an adverse possession be shown as is, in itself, a bar
to an action. (Adams v. Rockwell, 16 Wend. 285) ."
A much later Massachusetts case, Peavy v. Moran,
256 Mass. 311, 152 N. E. 360 at page 362, carries the rule
up to modem time in the following language:

"The description in the deed to the plaintiff
was explicit and free from ambiguity. Consequently parol evidence was not admissible to vary or
contradict it."
As far as defendants has been able to discover this
Court has not had an occasion to set down in specific
language the parol evidence rule but in several cases the
Court has recognized and applied the rule and stated that
the law of Utah recognized and adhered to the rule. See
Ruthauff v. Silver King Western Mine & Mill Co., 95
Utah 279, 80 P. 2d 338; Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah
52, 185 P. 2d 264; Olson v. Reese, 114 Utah 411, 200
P. 2d 733.
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The trial court, in his decision and over the objections of defendants, has accepted and applied extrinsic and
parol evidence in such a way as to completly change the
property which was described in the warranty deed.
The judgment of the Court awards to plaintiffs a
piece of property, 140 x 200, which commences 33 feet
east of the center of 9th East Street. No such line was
ever mentioned or described in the deed or contract. No
such line was ever discussed by the parties. The Court,
in effect, is giving to plaintiffs what they would wish to
have if they obtained from defendant property which after
the execution and delivery of the contract and deed they
discovered they would like.
The Court's judgment destroys in a large measure
the value of the east part of defendant Fay Beckstead's
land. It reduces the strip there from a width of 75 feet,
which is an adequate building lot, to a width of 43 feet
which is too small a building lot to be usable in the vicinity where the homes are being constructed.
The Court's decree gives to plaintiffs something for
which they did not bargain or pay for. and something
which, under the terms of the written instrument no one
ever intended for them to have.
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It is respectfully submitted that the trial court permitted a direct and extensive violation of the parol evidence rule and allowed, by parol, the variance of a written
deed and created a description which was never intended
by the defendants nor the plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that this Court should
reverse the trial court, should order that the Deed be restored to its terms and that these defendants should be
allowed and awarded a reasonable sum for the use of the
property by the plaintiffs and for damages incurred for
malicious clouding of the defendants' title.
Respectfully submitted
KING AND HUGHES

Attorneys for defendants and Appellants
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